The Middle East is once again on the brink of war. The recent escalation between Iran and Israel and the US’s bombing of three Iranian nuclear sites begs one looming question: should Iran get the atomic bomb?

For decades, western policymakers have wanted only one thing: Iran must never get the bomb. There are many fears associated with this thinking: nuclear arms race in the region, atomic terrorism by Iran, and unpredictable behavior of the regime leadership. These fears could have some rationale standing, but that cannot justify the claim that Iran should not get the bomb.

This article tests one of the most inadmissible claims that a nuclear-armed Iran would bring more stability to the region than now.

Strategic Inevitability:

There were many celebrations after the US B-2 bombers destroyed the three nuclear sites of Iran—namely Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. It must be clear that, though the bombing might have delayed Iran’s near-acquisition of atomic weapons, these bombings have not destroyed the ultimate will of the country or the knowledge the state has acquired on the nuclear program.  

Sanctions or such attacks might convince Iran to halt its nuclear program temporarily, but it is an unlikely situation. For instance, North Korea, despite the sanctions or UN Security Council resolutions, developed the bomb. Iran’s case is no different. The country thinks that her entire security depends on it and sanctions would not change her mind; yet, it will increase her vulnerability and harden the fact that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is the ultimate goal.

Iran is adamant that only nuclear weapons address can address its security vulnerabilities. However, sanctions or attacks on nuclear sites only deepen Iranians’ conviction and cement their will that the acquisition of atomic weapons will provide them the ultimate security that they seek.

No attacks or sanctions can destroy Iran’s strategic inevitability to achieve nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Ambiguity:

 There is another possible situation in Iran’s nuclear weapons program: Iran might acquire the nuclear weapon quickly and does not test them. However, this situation is known, in International Relations, as ‘nuclear ambiguity’. This situation might satisfy the US and European powers at the moment but will not end Israel’s security vulnerabilities—as she will feel threatened.

Israel, finding herself in a fragile situation, might continue to sabotage Iran’s nuclear arsenal as Israel perceives it as a mortal threat. This situation might lead Israel to subvert Iran’s nuclear weapons through cyberattacks and espionage— leading Iran to conclude that only weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks.

In the end, strategic ambiguity might delay the inevitable, leading to a dangerous situation of more miscalculations and risks.

Strategic Imbalance:

International Relations theorists argue that no other region of the world has a lone nuclear state—except the Middle East. As Kenneth Waltz says, “It is Israel’s nuclear arsenal, not Iran’s desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis.”

Israel wants to be the sole nuclear power in the region. That’s why Israel has made it a policy to stop its neighbors from going nuclear — by force if necessary. In 1981, it bombed Iraq’s Osirak reactor before it could become operational. Then in 2007, it did the same to Syria’s Al-Kibar facility, wiping it out in a surprise airstrike. Israel is doing the same to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. But power begs to be balanced.

Until Iran does not balance Israel’s unchecked nuclear threat in the region, the power balance of the area will remain imbalanced—making it more vulnerable to escalation, threat, and conflict.

Therefore, Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is essential to equate Israel’s nuclear weapons.

Fears associated with Iran’s nuclear program:

The first fear is associated with the regime’s leadership. The critics claim that the regime’s leadership is very much ideologically driven to be trusted with such power. More pertinently, these fears are biased and do not have rationale—if history is a guide.Once revolutionary regimes are in possession of nuclear weapons, they become more cautious.

China’s behavior, for instance, after 1964, when the country acquired nuclear weapons, became more restrained, not more aggressive. The politicians realize that, once they possess such destructive power, the atomic weapons make them a prime target—especially for global powers who would not tolerate nuclear recklessness.

Another unbounded fear is that once Iran possesses the nuclear weapon, the regime would feel more confident and start assertive attacks through proxies on other countries—might even transfer atomic technology. But history does not tell so. No country has ever transferred nuclear technology to a group that it cannot manage or control. Then, how could Iran transfer such a dear and prized technology?

Lastly, Iran’s nuclear acquisition could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region. The nuclear proliferation regime has been since the 1970s and has not happened on a massive scale. For instance, Israel acquired the weapon when most of the Arab states were hostile toward her. If Israel’s nuclear acquisition did not trigger any atomic arms race in the region, then why would Iran’s nuclear acquisition do so?

Mutual Deterrence:

As power begs to be balanced, so does Israel’s unchecked nuclear imbalance in the region. Iran’s acquisition of atomic weapons would bring strategic balance in the power dynamics of the Middle East and stability.

Iran’s nuclear weapon would counter-balance Israel’s nuclear weapon, and both countries would act in more restraint—deterring each other. This equation of power balance would bring more stability to the region.

Toward Strategic Stability:

Strategic stability is possible when the power balance in the region is maintained.  Before the 1990s, the South Asian region was facing its worst power imbalance—as Pakistan and India fought many major wars with each other. After both countries acquired nuclear weapons, they behaved in more retrained ways, and no major war erupted between them—except last month’s claims of nuclear threshold escalation.

A nuclear Iran could actually stabilize the region because Iran’s nuclear weapons would equate the power dynamics of the region, forcing both Iran and Israel to think twice before attacking each other. When both sides have the ability to strike back, deterrence kicks in, and with it a kind of restraint. This is the reason why Cold War remained cold between the US and USSR.

Conclusion:

The general wisdom, that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could destabilize the region, deserves rethinking. History, theory, and precedent suggest it another way.

A nuclear-armed Iran could balance Israel’s long-standing nuclear advantage, creating a system of mutual deterrence that helps prevent war. Without that balance, Israel will continue to operate without fear of consequences — and the region will stay trapped in a cycle of violence, where ordinary people pay the highest cost. All in all, should Iran not get the bomb?

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